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Highlighs 
 
• The present paper represents the first study exploring the effectiveness of R&D-marketing as 
compared to R&D-sales cooperation for new product development under different market 
and organizational circumstances in business-to-business settings 
• The effect of R&D-marketing and R&D-sales cooperation on new product advantage varies 
significantly depending on the velocity of the market environment, company strategy and 
R&D characteristics 
• Using a cross-industry dyadic data set of 230 industrial firms, we show that R&D–marketing 
cooperation exhibits a stronger association with new-product advantage if firms follow a cost 
leadership strategy, if R&D holds high power levels regarding new-product decisions, and if 
R&D collectivism is strongly pronounced 
• Firms might foster R&D-sales cooperation if technological turbulence is strongly pronounced 
in the market, if the firm follows a differentiation strategy and if R&D is influential in firm-
wide budgeting decisions 
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The Contingent Roles of R&D–Sales versus R&D–Marketing Cooperation in 
New-Product Development of Business-to-Business Firms 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This investigation explores the effectiveness of R&D–marketing cooperation as compared to 
R&D–sales cooperation for new-product development under different market and organizational 
circumstances in business-to-business settings. Using a cross-industry dyadic data set of 230 
industrial firms, we show that the effects of R&D–marketing and R&D–sales cooperation on 
new-product advantage vary significantly, depending on the velocity of the market environment, 
company strategy, and R&D characteristics. Specifically, R&D–marketing cooperation exhibits a 
stronger association with new-product advantage if firms follow a cost leadership strategy, if 
R&D holds high power levels regarding new-product decisions, and if R&D collectivism is 
strongly pronounced. Conversely, R&D–sales cooperation exhibits a stronger effect on new-
product advantage if technological turbulence is pronounced in the market, if the firm follows a 
differentiation strategy, and if R&D is influential in firm-wide budgeting decisions. These results 
may help firms decide which R&D cooperation type might be encouraged to maximize 
innovation success in a given situation. 
 
 
Keywords: sales; marketing; research and development; cross-functional cooperation; new-
product development.
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Sixty-eight percent of the sales managers in a cross-industry, cross-national survey state that for 
effective new-product development R&D should cooperate with marketing as well as sales.1 
 
1. Introduction 
Marketing research and practice now regard integration of the voice of the customer into 
the innovation process as critical to avert new-product failures and foster innovation success 
(Griffin & Hauser 1996). The innovation process might incorporate the voice of the customer by 
encouraging cooperation of R&D with either marketing or sales (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 
2010). As our introductory quote illustrates, a majority of sales managers hold the view that in 
addition to the marketing department, the sales department might provide an important 
contribution to a successful innovation process. In light of the high relevance of including 
customer knowledge in innovation processes, our primary goal is to compare the effectiveness of 
R&D–marketing cooperation with R&D–sales cooperation for relative new-product advantage 
under varying organizational and market conditions in a business-to-business context.  
While prior research has intensively investigated R&D–marketing cooperation, academic 
literature on R&D–sales cooperation is scarce (Joshi 2010). A key study on collaborations with 
R&D is the first—and to our best knowledge the only—study to analyze the effect of R&D–sales 
cooperation on new-product performance (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010). That investigation 
shows that integrating R&D with marketing or sales might increase innovation success, but does 
not account for contingency factors of the relationships between R&D–sales/R&D–marketing 
cooperation and new-product performance. Therefore, it remains unclear whether R&D–sales 
cooperation or R&D–marketing cooperation is more effective in promoting new-product success 
under certain market or organizational circumstances.  
                                                 
1 Survey of a professional market research agency (usamp), which we employed; see Web Appendix W8. 
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This research question may hold implications for the marketing literature on cross-
functional cooperation in innovation processes. While the prevailing view posits that to achieve 
new-product success companies should rely on both R&D–sales and R&D–marketing 
cooperation (Ernst, Hoyer & Rübsaamen 2010), we propose that companies may employ either 
R&D–sales or R&D–marketing cooperation, depending on market and organizational 
contingency factors. We thus apply a contingency approach to cross-functional cooperation 
(Troy, Hirunyawipada, & Paswan 2008; Olson, Walker, & Ruekert 1995) based on the key 
notion that the voice of the customer might be heard in the innovation process through either 
marketing or sales. Figure 1 provides an overview of the different research perspectives on 
R&D–sales as compared to R&D–marketing cooperation.  
Simultaneously, our research question might hold relevance for firms, as in the face of 
financial resource constraints firms may face a trade-off between fostering R&D–sales 
cooperation and R&D–marketing cooperation, forcing them to decide for one cooperation type. 
However, in different situations, the impact on innovation success of R&D–sales as compared to 
R&D–marketing cooperation may vary strongly. For instance, we find that for high technological 
turbulence R&D–sales cooperation is highly effective whereas R&D–marketing cooperation is 
rather ineffective. Hence, our results may help firms decide which R&D cooperation might be 
encouraged to maximize innovation success in a given situation. 
To investigate this research question, we developed a conceptual framework comparing the 
contingent influence of both R&D interfaces on relative new-product advantage. More 
specifically, we conceptualize the effect of both R&D–marketing and R&D–sales cooperation on 
relative new-product advantage to depend on market environment factors (technological 
turbulence, competitive intensity) and company strategy factors (differentiation strategy, cost 
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leadership strategy) as well as characteristics of the R&D department (R&D culture, R&D 
power). Drawing on the resource-based view (Verona 1999) and the thought-world concept 
(Homburg & Jensen 2007), we propose that knowledge and competences specific to each 
department enhance the effectiveness of one cooperation type relative to the other contingent on 
these market, company strategy, and R&D factors. 
Figure 1 – Research Perspectives on R&D–Sales and Marketing Cooperation 
Marketing and Sales as
one Entity
Perspectives on Cross-Functional
Cooperation of R&D 
with Marketing and Sales
Marketing and Sales as
two Entities
Conceptually treat marketing and sales as
equal in new product development Basic Philosophy
Marketing and sales should not be treated
equally in new product development
“Empirical studies have typically not
distinguished between marketing and sales
but have subsumed  both under the term  
“marketing  organization””
(Homburg, Jensen, and Krohmer 2008, p. 133)
Quote Regarding Basic Philosophy
„The role of sales in new product 
development needs to be explicitly 
examined beyond that of marketing” 
(Ernst, Hoyer, and Rübsaamen 2010, p. 80)
Selected articles:
• Ruekert and Walker 1987
• Song and Montoya-Weiss 2001
• Moenaert et al. 1995
• Moenaert and Souder 1990
• Olson et al. 2001
• Song and Parry 1997
• …
Related Literature
Only article:
• Ernst, Hoyer, and Rübsaamen (2010)
RESEARCH GAP
Contingency Perspective of R&D-
Sales/Marketing Cooperation:
Under what contingencies should
companies rely on R&D-Sales versus 
R&D-Marketing cooperation?
Basic Philosophy: Marketing and sales
should not be treated equally in new
product development and their effects
should be differentiated for various
contingency factors
 
To test our research model, we collected survey data from key informants of 230 business-
to-business companies across a range of industries. For each firm, we matched responses of one 
senior executive from the market side (e.g., head of sales) with one senior executive from the 
technical side (e.g., head of R&D). This approach improves the reliability of our measurement 
and limits the likelihood of common method bias as an explanation for relationships discovered 
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in our model. In addition, we obtained objective data from company records to validate our key 
performance measures. In confirmation of the proposition of a contingency account of R&D–
marketing and R&D–sales cooperation, we find that depending on the market environment, 
company strategies, and R&D characteristics, the influence of the two cooperation types on 
relative new-product advantage differs significantly.  
Our study makes two additions to marketing research on cross-functional cooperation. Our 
primary research contribution is a new perspective on the role of marketing and sales in new-
product development processes of business-to-business firms. In acknowledgement of 
fundamental differences between the sales and marketing departments in terms of knowledge and 
work orientations, we propose and empirically verify a contingency account of R&D–marketing 
and R&D–sales cooperation in the new-product development process. Underlining the need for a 
contingency perspective, researchers have concluded that although “cross-functional cooperation 
may indeed have a direct impact on success, the combination of cooperation with other variables 
may be of greater importance” (Troy, Hirunyawipada, & Paswan 2008, p. 132). Our second 
contribution relates to the limited investigation of R&D–sales cooperation in an innovation 
context (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010) in that we identify contingency factors influencing 
the effectiveness of the relationship between R&D–sales cooperation and relative new-product 
advantage. 
Our findings may have implications for the involvement of sales and marketing in 
innovation processes of industrial firms. Engaging in cooperation in innovation processes is 
costly for R&D in terms of time, coordination effort, and potential frictions. In this respect, our 
results indicate that unconditionally fostering the cooperation of R&D with both marketing and 
sales may be neither necessary nor cost-effective. Instead, firms might carefully evaluate which 
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department is more suited to cooperation with R&D given the particular market and 
organizational circumstances. In this vein, we provide recommendations for strengthening either 
R&D–sales or R&D–marketing cooperation, depending on the situation.   
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 Resource-based view and thought-world differences 
Our conceptualization for the differential effects of R&D–sales and R&D–marketing 
cooperation on relative new-product advantage rests on two bases. First, we rely on the resource-
based view, which posits that resources necessary for innovation success are dispersed across 
organizational functions and which has been regularly applied to cross-functional cooperation 
research (Verona 1999; Olson, Walker, & Ruekert 1995). Second, we base our argumentation on 
the thought-world concept (Dougherty 1992), which distinguishes the marketing and sales 
functions in terms of basic orientations, competences, and knowledge bases (Homburg & Jensen 
2007). 
2.1.1 The resource-based view  
Theoretical support for predictions that link cross-functional cooperation to product 
innovation success can be drawn from the resource-based view (Ruekert & Walker 1987). For 
new-product development, the requisite resources are spread across the organization. In 
particular, specialist knowledge and informational resources tend to reside at the level of 
functionally differentiated subunits like sales, marketing, and R&D (Krasnikov & Jayachandran 
2008). The dispersion and complementarity of functional resources lead to the argument that 
innovation processes benefit from cross-functional coupling that allows the cooperation of 
subunit-specific skills and knowledge. In other words, the more strongly firms encourage 
cooperation between functional subunits in innovation processes, the more likely the functions 
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are to share specific resources and hence the better new products should actually perform (Troy, 
Hirunyawipada, & Paswan 2008). 
While the prior reasoning elucidates why cooperation between functions is generally 
beneficial for innovation processes, which particular function R&D should cooperate with 
remains unclear. For a cooperation to be instrumental, two requirements have to be met: the 
cooperation partner must be endowed with the appropriate resources to fulfill the respective task, 
and these resources have to be exchanged smoothly, without friction, between the cooperation 
partners to effectively accomplish the respective task (Pfeffer & Salanczik 1978). From this 
reasoning, it follows that to achieve innovation success, R&D should cooperate with the 
department (1) that is endowed with the appropriate resources for new-product development 
under the given circumstances and (2) with which information exchange is more effective 
(Olson, Walker, & Ruekert 1995). In this respect, the thought-world concept helps to fathom 
resource endowments and exchange effectiveness of the marketing and sales departments to 
distinguish the optimal partner for R&D under different conditions. 
2.1.2 Linking the resource-based view with the thought worlds of marketing and sales 
A thought world comprises a community of persons engaged in a certain domain of 
activity and holding a common understanding of that activity (Dougherty 1992). The thought-
world concept proposes that departments develop interpretative schemes to guide perceptions 
and actions of department members. Constituent facets of thought worlds are a “fund of 
knowledge”—what departments know—and "systems of meaning"—how departments know 
(Dougherty 1992, p. 182).  
Academia has established that marketing and sales are discrete functions with different 
responsibilities and task foci (Homburg, Jensen, & Krohmer 2008). Moreover, these distinct 
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thought worlds entail different resource endowments in terms of knowledge and work 
orientation. Owing to these diverging resource endowments, certain market or organizational 
environments may render cooperation between either R&D–sales or R&D–marketing more 
effective for relative new-product advantage. In developing our hypotheses, we elaborate on the 
specific thought-world differences between marketing and sales and how these translate to 
differential effectiveness of R&D–sales cooperation and R&D–marketing cooperation under 
different contingencies. 
2.2 Description of conceptual model 
2.2.1 Basic linkages in the framework  
Our conceptual model reflects as a basic link the direct effect of R&D–marketing as well 
as R&D–sales cooperation on relative new-product advantage (Figure 2). In line with prior 
research, we define relative new-product advantage as our key new-product development 
outcome, in terms of the degree to which the product has unique attributes and is superior to rival 
products in quality and technical performance (Song & Montoya-Weiss 2001). Thus, new-
product advantage is a measure of innovation success relative to competitive offers. Prior 
research views the relative nature of new-product advantage as a key aspect of this concept, as 
innovation success needs to be assessed on the basis of rival offerings in the market. We chose 
new-product advantage as our key dependent variable because prior research has firmly 
established it as a valid measurement of new-product success and found it to exhibit high 
predictive validity regarding firm outcome measures (Li & Calantone 1998; Song & Montoya-
Weiss 2001). In this respect, prior research revealed that relative new-product advantage is 
positively associated with perceived product performance (Edgett, Shipley, & Forbes 1992), firm 
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market performance (Li & Calantone 1998), and relative product profitability, firm market share, 
and relative sales (Song & Parry 1997). 
Furthermore, employing a behavioral perspective (Gupta, Raj, & Wilemon 1986), we 
define R&D–sales (R&D–marketing) cooperation as intensity of information sharing and 
interaction concerning key tasks in the new-product development process between R&D and 
sales (marketing) (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010).  
2.2.2 Contingency factors 
Implementing the contingency approach in our conceptual model, we include market and 
company factors that moderate the relationship of both R&D–sales and R&D–marketing 
cooperation on relative new-product advantage. We derive the moderators for the conceptual 
framework on the basis of the strategic fit paradigm—a core concept regarding the 
interdependence of organizational structure, environment, and strategy (Ginsberg & 
Venkatraman 1985). The strategic fit approach suggests that to maximize corporate performance, 
a company’s structure and strategy needs to align with the external environment. On the basis of 
this notion, we derive moderators in the categories of market environment, company strategy, 
culture of the R&D department, and R&D power.  
We focus on competitive intensity and technological turbulence as the major descriptors of 
a company’s market environment. While competitive intensity captures the frequency and impact 
of competitor moves that a firm faces in the market, technological turbulence comprises the pace 
and significance of product-related technological changes in the industry (Jaworski & Kohli 
1993). Regarding companies’ strategic focus, we include differentiation strategy and cost 
leadership strategy in the conceptual framework (Porter 1980). Differentiation strategy, which is 
a company’s positioning approach in the market, we define as the extent to which a company’s 
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market positioning focuses on providing superior product value to the customer. Unlike 
differentiation strategy, with its external focus, cost leadership strategy concerns companies’ 
internal organization, and we define it as the extent to which a company attempts to rationalize 
organizational processes to realize cost-saving potentials. 
With regard to characteristics of the R&D department, we examine R&D’s cultural facets 
as well as its domain-specific power within the organization. Concerning R&D culture, we 
consider power distance and level of collectivism as two major cultural dimensions from 
Hofstede’s seminal conceptualization of culture pertaining to how individuals view social 
relationships in the department (Hofstede & Bond 1984). Power distance refers to how important 
department members consider hierarchical aspects to be and specifically is understood as the 
extent to which less powerful members accept and expect that power is distributed unequally 
(Hofstede & Bond 1984). Level of collectivism is the degree to which cooperation of department 
members in groups is appreciated and fostered (Hofstede & Bond 1984).  
Finally, regarding the power of R&D in the organization, we distinguish between R&D’s 
influence in its core domain—the new-product development process—and R&D’s influence on 
internal company decisions. We specify influence on new-product development as R&D’s 
potential to determine goals, procedures, and product features in innovation processes. We 
conceptualize influence on internal budgeting decisions as R&D’s potential to affect 
intraorganizational budget and resource allocation decisions. In what follows, we draw on our 
conceptual framework to develop our hypotheses.
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FIGURE 2 – Contingency Account of R&D–Sales versus R&D–Marketing Cooperation: Conceptual 
Framework 
 
R&D-Sales 
Cooperation
(RSC)1,2
R&D-Marketing 
Cooperation
(RMC)1,2
Relative New 
Product
Advantage1,3
Market Environment
• Technological Turbulence2
(TT) 
(H1: TT high: β RSC > β RMC)
• Competitive Intensity1(CI) 
(H2: CI high: β RSC > β RMC)
Company Strategy1
• Differentiation Strategy (DS) 
(H3: DS high: β RSC > β RMC)
• Cost Leadership Strategy (CS)
(H4: CS high: β RSC < β RMC)
R&D Culture2
• Power Distance (PD) 
(H6: PD high: β RSC > β RMC)
• Collectivism (CO) 
(H5: CO high: β RSC < β RMC)
R&D Power2
• R&D Influence on 
New Product Decisions (ID) 
(H7: ID high: β RSC < β RMC)
• R&D Influence on 
int. Budgeting Decisions (IB)
(H8: IB high: β RSC > β RMC)
TT: +
TT: 0
CI: 0
CI: -
DS: +
DS: 0
CS: 0
CS: +
PD: +
PD: 0
CO: 0
CO: +
ID: -
ID: 0
IB: +
IB: -
Data Sources:
1) Market-Side Respondent
2) Technical-Side Respondent
3) Validated by objective company data
Financial New 
Product
Performance1
Mean value of market-side response and
technical-side responsea
Mean value of market-side response and
technical-side responsea
 
Notes. The hypotheses (H1–H8) refer to the simple slopes of RSC/RMC at high values of the moderators (Mean + 1 * standard deviation). RSC = R&D–sales cooperation; RMC = 
R&D–marketing cooperation; we do not derive a hypothesis on the relative new-product  financial new-product performance effect as it is established by prior research (Song & 
Montoya-Weiss 2001); aTo be consistent with prior research on innovation success (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010) and to ascertain congruent assessments of the cooperation 
types, we verified interrater reliability of the market-side and technical-side responses and subsequently aggregated the measurements. 
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3. Hypotheses development 
We discuss our predictions regarding the moderating effects on the relationship between 
R&D–marketing and R&D–sales cooperation on relative new-product advantage in the following 
order: (1) market environment factors, (2) company strategies, and (3) R&D culture and power.  
3.1 The moderating influence of market environment factors 
The resource-based view proposes that in forming a cooperation, the function holding the 
resources most suited to effective task fulfillment should be selected (Olson, Walker, & Ruekert 
1995). Therefore, in new-product development, in markets characterized by high technological 
turbulence R&D should cooperate with the department that can provide superior information on 
technological developments in the industry. Drawing from the thought-world concept, we 
delineate differences between marketing and sales in terms of orientations and knowledge bases. 
On the basis of these thought-world differences, we argue that if technological turbulence is 
pronounced, R&D–sales cooperation is more beneficial to relative new-product advantage than 
R&D–marketing cooperation. 
As a firm’s boundary-spanning function and the “face of the company to the customer,” 
sales undoubtedly has the closest contact with customers and competitors (Kotler, Rackham, & 
Krishnaswamy 2006). In line with the thought-world concept, this configuration of sales tasks 
and responsibilities directly shapes sales’ knowledge funds. Owing to its close contact to 
customers and competitors, sales should generally have more up-to-date and accurate market 
knowledge than marketing (Joshi 2010):  “Sales has higher levels of specific market knowledge 
(i.e. about customers and competitors) than marketing” (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen (2010, p. 
82). As market knowledge about customers and competitors represents a key dimension of a 
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market orientation (Narver & Slater 1990), we expect salespeople to be more market-oriented 
than employees of the marketing department. 
Several research streams share the notion that the sales force constitutes firms’ primary 
source of market information on customer needs, product features, and competitors’ products. In 
this vein, literature investigating the marketing–sales interface proposes that sales is endowed 
with higher levels of knowledge about customer needs and the product features customers 
demand (Homburg & Jensen 2007; Rouziès et al. 2005; Cespedes 1996). In addition, research on 
companies’ information processing argues that salespeople are critical for generating firms’ 
market information (Le Bon & Merunka 2006; Hughes, Le Bon, & Rapp 2013; Ahearne et al. 
2013). Explicating this notion, Hughes, Le Bon, & Rapp (2013, p. 91) state that “the sales force 
may be a company’s single best internal source of market, customer, and competitor information 
due to its frequent contact with customers, vendors, and other individuals present in the supply 
chain.”  
Further elaborating on the knowledge-related differences between marketing and sales, the 
different task environment of the two departments promotes distinct thought worlds in terms of 
technical product-related knowledge. This proposition is in accordance with the notion of the 
salesperson as a knowledge broker (Verbeke, Dietz, & Verwaal 2011), as a critical task of 
salespeople is to explain the firm’s offering to the customer. That is, a core constituent of the 
selling task is that salespeople are able to communicate technical product features and product 
advantages and disadvantages. Additionally, sales is involved in solving customers’ immediate 
problems with products (Homburg & Jensen 2007). These tasks require salespeople to have high 
levels of technical knowledge. That is, the sales function “demands that salespeople acquire and 
possess knowledge about their products (at times the science behind their products), as well as 
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about the way these products help their customers solve their problems” (Verbeke, Dietz, & 
Verwaal 2011, p. 422). Consequently, to meet their key responsibility to explain the product to 
the customer and be able to sell successfully, salespeople have to deal with product features in 
detail. Owing to this strong focus on product specifications and how these fit with customers’ 
technical demands, sales should have higher levels of technical knowledge than marketing. 
Figuratively, salespeople are “attuned to which product features will fly and which will die” 
(Kotler, Rackham, & Krishnaswamy 2006, p. 3). Despite salespeople’s closeness to customers 
and their resulting high levels of knowledge, marketing’s long-horizon view (Homburg & Jensen 
2007) might suggest the effectiveness of promoting R&D–marketing cooperation in an 
environment with high technological turbulence. However, while marketing’s long-term 
orientation may represent a valuable strategic input to the innovation process, the counter-
argument may be that in a turbulent, highly dynamic environment, short-term guidance and 
information are required. In this respect, prior research firmly underlines that particularly in 
dynamic environments, immediate organizational adaptiveness and responsiveness to external 
requirements represent core capabilities for innovation success (Calantone, Garcia, & Dröge 
2003; Hurley & Hult 1998; Han, Kim, & Srivastava 1998). Thus, leveraging sales’ up-to-date 
market knowledge in new-product development may be especially beneficial in dynamic 
environments that require high firm responsiveness.  
In sum, because of their boundary-spanning function and close contact to customers, 
salespeople routinely receive a steady flow of in-depth information about developments in the 
market. Therefore, since compared to marketing sales should have higher levels of up-to-date 
knowledge of customers’ needs as well as higher levels of technical knowledge, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. If technological turbulence is high, R&D–sales cooperation has a more positive 
effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation. 
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If competitive intensity is high, a critical goal of firms’ new-product development is to 
create a product that matches or exceeds the value provided by competitive products (Homburg, 
Workman, & Krohmer 1999). To this effect, R&D requires extensive information on competitive 
offers currently sold in the market. Further, beyond existing competitive offers, intelligence on 
prospective products of competitors is critical to counter these developments. In recognition of 
the strong information needs of R&D if competitive intensity is high, on the basis of the 
resource-based view R&D should cooperate with the department that can provide superior 
information on competitors’ product innovations.  
The thought-world concept suggests that the type of information a department holds 
depends on its core tasks and responsibilities (Homburg & Jensen 2007). As the firm’s 
boundary-spanning function, sales is strongly connected in the market and has close customer 
relationships. Salespeople might leverage these network relationships to find out about 
“competitor’s projects, learn about new product launches before they take place, [and] discover 
new products in test market areas” (Le Bon & Merunka 2006, p. 396). The boundary-spanning 
position allows sales to harvest more accurate, relevant, and up-to-date knowledge about 
competitors than marketing, which has no direct customer contact: “although multiple sources 
for attaining competitive intelligence exist, the richest source of [competitive intelligence] comes 
from salespeople, because they frequently interact with customers and competitive intelligence is 
an integral part of selling activities” (Ahearne et al. 2013, p. 37). Arguing that sales’ specific 
knowledge about competitors and competitors’ innovations is more sophisticated than 
marketing‘s competitive intelligence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. If competitive intensity is high, R&D–sales cooperation has a more positive effect 
on relative new-product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation. 
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3.2 The moderating influence of company strategy factors 
3.2.1 Differentiation strategy 
A company following a differentiation strategy strives to provide superior value to 
customers (Walkert & Ruekert 1987), which results from fully addressing the customer’s needs. 
Therefore, if a company follows a differentiation strategy focusing on value creation for the 
customer, R&D requires precise information on customer wishes. Beyond knowledge of 
customer needs, R&D requires information on the features of competitive offers to be able to 
differentiate the product from rivals and thus achieve a relative product advantage. 
Consequently, in companies that follow a differentiation strategy to achieve innovation success, 
R&D must cooperate with the department that provides superior information on customer needs 
and competitors’ offers. Because of its diverse linkages in the market, the sales department 
possesses higher levels of specific knowledge about customers and competitors than marketing 
(Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010). Hence, “the sales force may be a company’s single best 
internal source of market, customer, and competitor information due to its frequent contact with 
customers, vendors, and other individuals present in the supply chain” (Hughes, Le Bon, & Rapp 
2013, p. 91). Thus:  
Hypothesis 3. If differentiation strategy is high, R&D–sales cooperation has a more positive 
effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation. 
 
3.2.2 Cost leadership strategy 
If a company follows a cost leadership strategy, its primary goal is to realize cost-saving 
potentials by rationalizing internal processes (Homburg, Workman, & Krohmer 1999). With 
respect to new-product development, a company’s cost leadership strategy is reflected in 
controlling costs for the new product and producing it in a cost-efficient manner (Engelen & 
Brettel 2012). While a differentiation strategy is closely intertwined with customizing products 
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for single customers (which is costly), limiting the costs in the innovation process entails the 
creation of relatively standardized products with a restricted product variety to avoid complexity 
costs. Given such standardized offerings, achieving relative new-product advantage critically 
depends on carefully identifying target customer segments and configuring the product with 
essential features that appeal to these target segments (Slater & Olson 2000). In other words, 
successfully implementing a cost leadership strategy in new-product development requires a 
sophisticated strategic positioning analysis of the offering in the market. Hence, if a company 
follows a cost-based strategy, R&D should cooperate with the department that is more proficient 
in positioning the offering strategically. 
Salespeople are typically responsible for a set of customers in a sales territory or in a 
specific industry segment, while marketing managers are typically responsible for a specific 
product or brand offered by the firm (Rouziès et al. 2005). Prior research shows that these 
fundamentally different thought worlds lead to distinct task orientations: while sales exhibits 
higher levels of customer orientation, marketing shows higher levels of product orientation 
(Homburg & Jensen 2007; Rouziès et al. 2005, Cespedes 1996). A product orientation indicates a 
focus on optimizing the product and developing product-related market strategies (Homburg & 
Jensen 2007). As a result of marketing’s focus on product optimization and positioning (Griffin 
& Hauser 1996; Cespedes 1996), R&D–marketing cooperation should be more beneficial to 
relative new-product advantage than R&D–sales cooperation if the company follows a cost 
leadership strategy. 
Further corroborating this argumentation, marketing generally assumes “broad strategic 
responsibilities” (Cespedes 1993, p. 37) for products and is often considered to be the strategy 
department: ”Sales has a much stronger and more operational link to individual customers, while 
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marketing has a more strategic focus on customer segments and the entire product business” 
(Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010, p. 82; see also Homburg, Workman, & Krohmer 1999). Prior 
research indicates that salespeople might focus excessively on individual customers and 
therefore “fail to see the big picture” (Beverland et al. 2006, p. 391; see also Ernst, Hoyer, & 
Rübsaamen 2010). Running contrary to the goals of a cost-based strategy, sales commonly 
reports information suggesting the addition of product features and the extension of product lines 
(Gordon et al. 1997; Judson et al. 2006). In sum, as market trend analysis, market segmentation, 
and product positioning constitute key marketing responsibilities (Griffin & Hauser 1996), which 
are important prerequisites for new-product advantage under a cost leadership strategy, we 
suggest: 
Hypothesis 4. If cost leadership strategy is high, R&D–marketing cooperation has a more 
positive effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–sales cooperation. 
 
3.3 R&D culture, R&D power, and the role of interfunctional relationships 
H1–H4 are based on the notion that according to the resource-based view, R&D should 
cooperate with the function that provides the most appropriate complementary resources for 
given circumstances. In addition, the resource-based view posits that R&D should cooperate with 
the function with which resource exchange is more effective (Pfeffer & Salanczik 1978). 
Drawing on this reasoning, we derive subsequent hypotheses (H5–H8) examining how R&D 
culture and R&D power influence the linkage between R&D–sales/marketing cooperation and 
relative new-product advantage. 
3.4 The moderating influence of R&D culture 
Prior research suggests that besides an overarching national and corporate culture, 
discernible cultural distinctions also exist between functional subunits (Hofstede 2002; Cooke & 
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Rousseau 1988). In what follows, our argumentation builds on the notion that the task 
characteristics of sales and marketing exert an influence on the departments’ subcultures beyond 
the influence of national culture. The effectiveness of resource exchange between departments 
depends on whether the departmental cultures fit to each other, particularly in terms of having 
similar working styles and communication patterns. Prior research shows that cultural misfits 
between departments lead to relationship conflict and reduce the quality of cooperation (Menon, 
Bharadwaj, & Howell 1996).  
3.4.1 Collectivism  
The cultural value of collectivism refers to how individuals perceive social relationships 
and the extent to which individuals’ cooperation in groups is appreciated (Hofstede & Bond 
1984). If a departmental culture is marked by high collectivism, department members focus on 
shared goals and value teamwork. We propose that if R&D’s culture tends to be collectivist, 
R&D should cooperate with marketing owing to a closer cultural fit, which facilitates resource 
exchange and eventually promotes a relative new-product advantage. 
Two characteristic of marketing’s task environment foster the likelihood that collectivist 
values are shared in the department. First, the task environment usually demands a significant 
portion of project-based work, such as the creation of advertising campaigns or preparation of an 
annual marketing plan (Cespedes 1996; Rouziès et al. 2005). The project-based nature of most 
marketing tasks promotes the occurrence of teamwork, rendering it an integral part of marketing 
activities and nurturing collectivist values (Griffin & Hauser 1996). Second, marketing is 
typically organized around brands and products, focusing project teams on collectively shared 
brand- or product-related goals, such as market-share objectives for a brand (Ernst, Hoyer, & 
Rübsaamen 2010). In contrast, research suggests that salespeople tend to hold individualistic 
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values (Weitz & Bradford 1999). As salespeople commonly receive personal goals and 
incentives, they focus strongly on their individual achievement, and as a result salespeople’s 
collectivist orientation should be rather low. Therefore, if R&D’s culture reflects high 
collectivism, to achieve a relatively closer cultural fit R&D should cooperate with marketing to 
enhance relative new-product advantage. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5. If R&D collectivism is high, R&D–marketing cooperation has a more positive 
effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–sales cooperation. 
 
3.4.2 Power distance 
The cultural dimension of power distance refers to department members’ perception of 
hierarchical, formalized power structures among employees and superiors (Hofstede & Bond 
1984). If power distance is pronounced within a function, hierarchies among department 
members are perceived as normal and relationships between employees and superiors tend to be 
formalized and strictly hierarchical. We predict that if R&D culture is characterized by high 
power distance, R&D should collaborate with sales to promote relative new-product advantage. 
Our reasoning rests on the notion that in the case of high R&D power distance, the cultural fit of 
R&D with the sales department is higher than with the marketing department, because the high 
level of formalized control and incentive systems in the sales department institutionalizes a 
departmental culture of high power distance.  
In sales departments, formalized managerial control systems of salesperson performance 
and associated incentive systems tend to be omnipresent (Piercy, Cravens, & Lane 2009; Geiger 
& Guenzi 2011; Homburg, Jensen, & Krohmer 2008). That is, “management control is a key 
dimension of running a sales organization” (Piercy, Cravens, & Lane 2009, p. 459).  Of all sales 
organizations in the US, 90% employ individual control and incentive systems for their sales 
force (Dustin & Belasen 2013). The prevalence of managerial control and incentive systems in 
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the sales department increases the likelihood of a high power distance culture for two reasons. 
First, a core task of sales managers is controlling salespeople’s performance, which sets the basis 
for salespeople’s compensation (Krafft 1999). Owing to their monitoring and controlling of 
salespeople’s performance, sales managers exert an enormous influence on salespeople’s 
compensation. This influence gives sales managers substantial power over their subordinate 
salespeople and establishes a rigid hierarchy fostering a culture of high power distance in sales 
departments. Importantly, target-setting and monitoring for salespeople on the sales team level 
instead of the individual level might encourage teamwork and induce a lower power distance in 
the sales department. However, to date, in 74% of sales departments in many industrial contexts, 
individual salesperson control and incentive systems seem to prevail (Burke & Cullen 2014). 
Second, the strong prevalence of control and incentive systems relating to salesperson 
performance foster a culture of high power distance because they enable and establish 
hierarchies among salespeople in the department. Salesperson performance may be easily 
quantified (e.g., based on sales volume) and is often visibly communicated in a sales department 
(Krafft 1999). For instance, to foster competition among salespeople, sales managers regularly 
communicate monthly or even daily rankings of each individual salesperson’s performance 
(Poujol, Fournier, & Tanner 2011). Hence, salespeople are often familiar with performance levels 
of their colleagues, promoting the establishment of hierarchies in sales department (Ibarra & 
Andrews 1993), again contributing to a departmental culture of high power distance in sales.  
Conversely, in the marketing department power distance should be less marked than in 
sales, because managerial control and incentive systems that enhance power distance are 
considerably less prevalent (Cespedes 1996; Homburg, Jensen, & Krohmer 2008) for three 
reasons. First, employee performance in marketing is considerably more difficult to quantify than 
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in sales owing to the long-term focus and low measurability (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010; 
Krafft 1999). For instance, for the marketing task of creating a strong brand image, payoffs may 
materialize in the distant future and be challenging to assess. Second, marketing’s tasks often 
require a long-term strategic perspective (Cespedes 1996; Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010). A 
high level of short-term control and incentive systems would constitute an impediment to 
marketing’s long-term focus: “Due to the incentives for salespeople and their results orientation, 
salespeople often tend to be more short-term–oriented than marketers” (Rouziès et al. 2009, p. 
115). Third, marketing’s tasks, such as creating brand equity or advertising and promotion 
material, often entail a high level of imagination (Andrews & Smith 1996). In this respect, prior 
research shows that high control and incentive levels may impair employee inventiveness (Ariely 
et al. 2009). Consequently, as the extent of managerial control and incentive systems is lower in 
the marketing department, power distance tends to be less pronounced than in sales.  
In sum, we suggest that owing to the higher prevalence of control and incentive systems in 
sales relative to marketing, the sales department’s culture tends to exhibit higher levels of power 
distance. Hence, to promote cultural fit and cooperation quality, if R&D’s culture is distinguished 
by high power distance, then to increase relative new-product advantage R&D should cooperate 
with the sales department rather than with marketing. 
Hypothesis 6. If R&D power distance is high, R&D–sales cooperation has a more positive effect 
on relative new-product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation. 
3.5 The moderating influence of R&D power 
3.5.1 R&D influence on new-product decisions  
The resource-based view suggests that R&D should cooperate with the department with 
which resource exchange is more effective. The effectiveness of the resource exchange between 
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departments is influenced by the interfunctional power configuration (Homburg & Jensen 2007). 
A power conflict might severely restrict the resource flow between the two functions and thus 
affect innovation success. Further, high levels of R&D influence on new-product decisions could 
create power conflicts in the cooperation of R&D with marketing as well as with sales. In that 
case, both R&D–sales cooperation and R&D–marketing cooperation might be unrelated to or 
even detrimental to relative new-product advantage.  
However, while we suggest that for high R&D new-product influence a power conflict 
between R&D and sales may arise, for the marketing department this should not be the case. As 
we previously suggested, marketing tends to hold collectivist values and commonly engages in 
teamwork (Griffin & Hauser 1996; Cespedes 1996). Consequently, the marketing department is 
considerably better equipped to cope with the power imbalance if R&D influence on new-
product decisions is high, and to maintain a sufficient level of cooperation quality. Hence, in this 
situation, the resource exchange among R&D and marketing should be more effective. In this 
respect, resource exchange between R&D and marketing may be essentially facilitated by top 
management, which has been characterized as “the force that pulls different functional groups 
together” (Swink 2000, p. 211). Top management may support the formation of formalized, 
collective work forms such as permanent team structures, regular meetings, or job rotation 
programs that favor R&D–marketing cooperation (Gupta, Raj, & Wilemon 1986; Swink 2000). 
Moreover, by allocating resources and power to these formalized collective work structures, top 
management may create an environment conducive to teamwork that again promotes the 
effectiveness of R&D–marketing cooperation (Swink 2000). In sum, if R&D’s influence on new-
product decisions is strong, requiring team spirit to counter potential conflicts arising from power 
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imbalances, R&D–marketing cooperation may be more conducive to innovation success owing 
to marketing’s familiarity with forms of collective work. 
Hypothesis 7. If R&D influence on new-product decisions is high, R&D–marketing cooperation 
has a more positive effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–sales cooperation. 
 
3.5.2 R&D influence on internal resource allocation  
A strong R&D influence on resource allocation decisions is indicative of a technology-
oriented firm that places emphasis on technological developments (Atuahene-Gima & 
Evangelista 2000). In such a technology-centered organizational context, cooperation of R&D 
with sales should be more conducive to relative new-product advantage. Owing to its key task of 
explaining products to customers, the sales force tends to hold considerably higher levels of 
technical knowledge than the marketing department (Homburg & Jensen 2007; Rouziès et al. 
2005; Cespedes 1996). In technology-oriented firms, the sales force’s market knowledge 
regarding technological trends may constitute a particularly critical input into the new-product 
development process. Consequently, if R&D influence on internal resource allocation decisions 
is high, reflecting a strong corporate emphasis on technology, owing to sales’ technological 
competence R&D–sales cooperation should be more beneficial for innovation success. Thus: 
Hypothesis 8. If R&D influence on internal resource allocation is high, R&D–sales cooperation 
has a more positive effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Data collection and sample 
4.1.1 Data collection procedure 
Empirical testing of our research model required data for variables such as R&D–sales 
cooperation, environmental factors, and organizational factors. While these variables cannot be 
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obtained through databases, senior executives involved in NPD projects can reasonably assess 
these constructs. Therefore, we relied on a key informant approach to test our hypotheses. We 
collected dyadic survey data from senior executives across multiple German business-to-business 
industries in which the issue of R&D–marketing and sales cooperation in new-product 
development is of importance. 
From a commercial list provider, we acquired a random sample of business-to-business 
manufacturing and technology firms that were likely to meet these criteria. Then, by screening 
data bases and corporate websites and through exploratory telephone calls, we identified firms 
that were suitable for testing our research questions. For 1,400 firms, we were able to identify a 
senior executive who had an overview of new-product development and our other variables of 
interest—in most cases the sales or marketing director. We contacted these executives by e-mail 
or telephone to solicit participation in the study. Depending on the respondent’s preference, the 
survey questionnaire was administered via ordinary mail or e-mail, or in the form of an online 
questionnaire for which we set up a website with an entry code for each respondent. 
4.1.2 Selection of dyads and data sources  
When we asked respondents to take part, we emphasized that our research question 
needed the participation of two executives per firm to capture the view of both the market side 
and the technical side. We obtained dyadic responses from 230 firms for a response rate of 16%, 
which compares favorably to prior multi-informant studies in the marketing literature (e.g., 
Homburg, Artz, & Wieseke 2012). Each dyad included one respondent from the market side 
(e.g., head of sales, head of marketing) and one respondent from the technical side (e.g., head of 
R&D, technical director). In the data analyses, we employ variables provided by both the market 
side (relative new-product advantage, competitive intensity, company strategies) and the 
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technical side (technological turbulence, R&D culture/power), and for R&D–sales and R&D–
marketing cooperation we use the aggregated responses of the market and technical sides. 
Importantly, relying on a key informant approach in line with prior research (e.g., Homburg & 
Jensen 2007), we do not differentiate in our data analyses between key respondents on the 
market side, such as sales and marketing managers, and those on the technical side between, for 
example, heads of R&D and technical directors.  
We collected dyadic data for two reasons. First, some of our constructs can be better 
assessed by informants who are closer to the market (e.g., competitive intensity) while others can 
be better assessed by informants who have a technical background (e.g., technological 
turbulence). Second, assessment of different constructs by different people limits the likelihood 
of common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  
Two tests controlled for potential nonresponse bias. First, we compared the distribution of 
the responding firms in terms of firm size and industry affiliation with that of the original 
population (Rogelberg & Stanton 2007). Results of χ² tests showed no significant differences 
between our sample and the original population. Second, comparison of the latest and earliest 
thirds of responses showed significant differences in scale means (p < .05) for only one of 11 
constructs, indicating that nonresponse bias should not be a major issue with our data 
(Armstrong & Overton 1977). Respondents’ average job experience is 20.5 years (SD = 7.7) for 
respondents on the market side and 20.9 years (SD = 7.8) for respondents on the technical side. 
Table 1 provides an overview of our sample. 
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TABLE 1 – Sample Composition and Respondent Job Titles 
Industry % Firm Sizea  % Market-side Respondent % 
Technical-side 
Respondent % 
Mechanical 
engineering 23.0 < 200 37.0 Head of sales 64.3 Head of R&D 61.3 
Machine tools 14.3 200 to 499 35.2 Head of marketing 14.8 Technical director 17.0 
Electronics 10.5 500 to 999 17.4 Managing director 8.3 Managing director 7.4 
Automotive 10.0 1,000 to 4,999 8.7 
Head of key account 
management 5.2 
Head of product 
management 3.9 
Synthetic 
materials 8.7 ≥ 5,000 1.7 Other 7.4 
Head of innovation 
management 2.2 
Medical 
equipment 4.8     
Head of application 
engineering 2.2 
Automation & 
robotics 4.3     Other 6.0 
Software 3.9       
Textile industry 3.1       
Other 17.4       
Note: Sample based on n = 230 firms. aNumber of employees 
4.2 Construct measurement, reliability diagnostics, and measurement validations 
Our study relied on existing scales drawn from prior studies. In the Appendix, we provide 
detailed information on all scales of the study, and Table 2 reports an intercorrelation matrix and 
descriptive statistics.  
4.2.1 Measurement of R&D–sales/marketing cooperation 
As our key independent variables, R&D–sales cooperation and R&D–marketing 
cooperation were rated by the respondent from the market side as well as from the technical side. 
To calculate the variables employed in the data analysis, we aggregated the market-side and 
technical-side responses (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010). That is, for R&D–sales cooperation 
of one firm we used the mean value of R&D–sales cooperation rated by the respective market-
side respondent and R&D–sales cooperation rated by the respective technical-side respondent. 
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This approach implies that on the market side both cooperation variables are rated by either a 
sales manager or a marketing manager. Prior research has demonstrated that this approach is 
feasible and that sales and marketing managers accurately assess variables related to their own 
and the other department. In this respect, effects of a cross-functional cooperation model do not 
vary for sales or marketing managers, implying that both provide accurate assessments 
(Homburg & Jensen 2007). 
To ensure the reliability of the aggregated measures and show that aggregation of the 
market-side and technical-side respondents for R&D–sales and R&D–marketing cooperation is 
justified, we calculated median within-group agreement (rwg), which is frequently used to 
validate data aggregation (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010; Bliese 2000; James, Demaree, & 
Wolf 1984). Our data show high median within-group agreement for R&D–sales cooperation 
(rwg = .88) and R&D–marketing cooperation (rwg = .91), indicating that aggregation is justified.  
4.2.2 Reliability diagnostics  
To assess the psychometric quality of our data, we computed Cronbach’s alpha and 
composite reliability for all reflective scales and found values ranging between 0.70 and 0.94. 
All scales exceeded the threshold values proposed in the literature (Bagozzi & Yi 1988; 
Nunnally 1978). Average variance extracted estimates of equal to or greater than 0.50 for all 
constructs affirm convergent validity of our scales (Bagozzi & Yi 1988). We also tested 
discriminant validity against the criterion proposed by Fornell and Larcker (1981), which 
requires that the average variance extracted from each factor exceed the squared correlations 
between this factor and all other constructs. All constructs passed this test. 
4.2.3 Validation of relative new-product advantage with objective company data 
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To assess external validity of the relative new-product advantage measure, we tested 
whether the variable is positively associated with companies’ realized profit. For a subsample of 
82 companies (36% of the sample), we were able to match survey responses with the respective 
company profit, which we obtained from a database of a commercial provider for business 
information (Bisnode). The zero-order correlation between the relative new-product advantage 
measure and corporate profit is positive and significant (r = .30, p < .01). When corporate profit 
is regressed on relative new-product advantage while controlling for industry affiliation and 
company size, the effect of the relative new-product advantage variable remains positive and 
significant (β = .21, p < .05). These results indicate that the relative new-product advantage 
measurement exhibits external validity. 
4.2.3 Validation of relative new-product advantage with financial new-product performance 
Additionally, we included financial new-product performance (provided by the market-side 
respondent) in the estimation of the moderated regression as an outcome of relative new-product 
advantage. We calculated a moderated mediation model to assess whether the indirect effects of 
R&D–sales and R&D–marketing cooperation indeed transfer to financial new-product 
performance via relative new-product advantage. Results of this analysis are displayed in Web 
Appendix W2 and illustrate that relative new-product advantage constitutes a key mediator 
between R&D–sales/marketing cooperation and financial new-product performance. 
4.3 Model estimation 
4.3.1 Analytical approach  
To estimate our empirical model, we employed moderated multivariate regression analysis 
with an ordinary least squares estimator (Aiken & West 1991). Model estimation relied on a two-
step approach. First, we estimated two baseline models, a full model including all hypothesized 
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interactions and eventually we replicated the full model without controls to establish its 
robustness. Prior to the model estimation, we centered all independent variables on their mean 
and we formed the interaction terms by multiplying the mean-centered predictor and the mean-
centered moderator (Aiken & West 1991). In the second step, for the hypotheses testing we drew 
on the results of the full model to conduct a simple slope analysis. A simple slope analysis tests 
the significance of a predictor’s main effect on a dependent variable at a specific value of the 
respective moderator. Applying the simple slope analysis to our research question, we compared 
the main effects of R&D–sales cooperation and R&D–marketing cooperation on relative new-
product advantage, reflecting our hypotheses, at high values of the hypothesized moderators and 
tested their significance. For example, we compared the main effects of R&D–sales and R&D–
marketing cooperation on relative new-product advantage if technological turbulence is high. In 
this respect, “high” refers to one standard deviation above the variable’s mean value and “low” 
refers to one standard deviation below the mean value. For all models estimated, inspection of 
variance inflation factors and condition indices indicates no substantial degree of 
multicollinearity (Kleinbaum et al. 1998). Table 3 provides the full results of the moderated 
regression estimations and Table 4 shows results of the simple slope analysis. In Table 3 and 
Table 4, we report standardized regression coefficients (denoted as β), which are calculated as 
follows: β = b * SD of predictor/SD of dependent variable; b = unstandardized regression 
coefficient, SD = standard deviation.  
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TABLE 2 – Intercorrelations, Descriptive Statistics, and Reliabilities 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. R&D–sales cooperation -               
2. R&D–marketing 
cooperation .15 -             
 
3. Relative new-product 
advantage .27 .17 -            
 
4. Competitive intensity -.09 -.09 -.08 -            
5. Technological 
turbulence .03 .11 -.01 .01 -          
 
6. Differentiation strategy .14 .23 .42 -.18 .07 -          
7. Cost leadership strategy .12 .22 .13 .09 .04 .23 -         
8. R&D power distance -.07 -.10 -.05 -.01 -.11 -.08 -.12 -        
9. R&D collectivism .10 .12 .08 -.01 .23 .10 .04 -.29 -       
10. R&D influence on new- 
product decisions -.11 -.16 -.04 .03 .06 -.12 -.04 -.19 .09 -     
 
11. R&D influence on 
internal budgeting 
decisions 
.04 .08 .08 -.07 .02 .12 .08 -.12 .18 .30 -    
 
12. Top management 
support .22 .07 .27 .03 .09 .21 .06 -.11 .28 .04 .07 -   
 
13. Size -.14 .24 -.13 -.01 .10 -.02 .15 -.03 .09 .02 .13 -.11 -   
14. Product customization .35 -.06 .13 -.03 .01 .09 -.01 -.09 .02 .01 -.04 .02 -.09 -  
15. Financial new-product 
performance .16 .15 .19 .00 .23 .16 .00 -.07 .22 .02 .11 .07 .11 -.02 - 
Means 4.10 3.47 5.11 5.16 4.31 5.76 5.08 2.41 5.22 52.53 23.32 5.37 5.72 5.20 4.89 
Standard deviation 1.14 1.69 1.05 .99 1.10 .94 1.11 1.01 1.24 19.03 18.95 1.07 1.16 1.51 1.32 
Cronbach’s alpha .92 .94 .79 .84 .82 .77 .71 .70 .86 .79 .80 .78 - .87 .93 
Note: Sample based on n = 230 firms. Absolute values of correlation coefficients above .13 (.17) are significant at a 5% (1%) level. 
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TABLE 3 – Results of the Moderated Regression Analysis 
 Dependent Variable: Relative New Product Advantage 
 
Model 1 
Main 
Effects 
Model 2 
Main Effects 
+ Moderators 
Model 3 
Full Model 
Model 3a 
Only RSC 
Terms 
Model 3b 
Only RMC 
Terms 
Model 4 
Full Model 
without 
Controls 
Model 4a 
Only RSC 
Terms 
Model 4b 
Only 
RMC 
Terms 
Main Effects         
R&D–sales cooperation .16** .13** .10* .12** - .19*** .20*** - 
R&D–marketing cooperation .14** .08ns .06ns - .07ns .04ns - .05ns 
Competitive intensity  -.01ns .04ns .02ns .04ns .06ns .03ns .01ns 
Technological turbulence  -.04ns -.05ns -.04ns -.05ns -.04ns -.04ns -.03ns 
Differentiation strategy  .34*** .37*** .43*** .35*** .43*** .45*** .43*** 
Cost leadership strategy  -.02ns -.01ns -.02ns .02ns .01ns -.01ns .03ns 
R&D power distance  .02ns .05ns .02ns .03ns .02ns .01ns -.01ns 
R&D collectivism  .06ns .06ns .04ns .08ns -.01ns -.01ns .01ns 
R&D influence on new-product 
decisions  -.02ns -.01ns -.01ns -.03ns .05ns .03ns .01ns 
R&D influence on internal 
budgeting decisions  .03ns .03ns .01ns .06ns .04ns .03ns .05ns 
R&D–sales Cooperation 
Interaction Effects         
R&D–sales cooperation x 
competitive intensity   -.01ns -.03ns - -.03ns -.04ns - 
R&D–sales cooperation x 
technological turbulence   .14** .12** - .14** .14** - 
R&D–sales cooperation x 
differentiation strategy   .12** .13** - .11* .12** - 
R&D–sales cooperation x Cost 
leadership strategy   -.11* -.08ns - -.08ns -.05ns - 
R&D–sales cooperation x R&D 
power pistance   .11** .12** - .14** .14** - 
R&D–sales cooperation x R&D 
collectivism   -.12** -.07ns - -.12** -.08ns - 
R&D–sales cooperation x R&D 
influence on new-product 
decisions 
  -.04ns -.03ns - -.05ns -.05ns - 
R&D–sales cooperation x R&D 
influence on internal budgeting 
decisions 
  .15** .10** - .14** .10** - 
R&D–marketing Cooperation 
Interaction Effects         
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
Competitive intensity   -.11* - -.14** -.10* - -.14** 
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
Technological turbulence   -.04ns - .01ns -.02ns - -.01ns 
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
Differentiation strategy   -.07ns - -.03ns -.05ns - -.01ns 
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
cost leadership strategy   .14** - .11** .16*** - .14** 
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
R&D power distance   -.01ns - -.01ns -.07ns - -.08ns 
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
R&D collectivism   .17*** - .12** .15*** - .14** 
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
R&D influence on new-product 
decisions 
  .11ns - .10* .08ns - .06ns 
R&D–marketing cooperation x 
R&D influence on internal 
budgeting decisions 
  -.13** - -.09* -.14** - -.13** 
Controls         
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Not Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Top management support .29*** .20*** .15*** .19*** .18*** - - - 
size -.04ns -.05ns .02ns .01ns -.03ns - - - 
Product customization .04ns .03ns .08ns .05ns .09ns - - - 
R² .22 .33 .42 .37 .35 .36 .31 .26 
Note: The table reports standardized coefficients. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed); RSC = R&D–sales cooperation; RMC = R&D–marketing cooperation. 
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4.3.2 Hypotheses testing 
Results of the moderated regression estimation and simple slope analysis corroborate our 
hypotheses that the relative effectiveness of R&D–marketing cooperation versus R&D–sales 
cooperation is contingent on market, company strategy, and R&D factors. In the following, we 
discuss the findings for the individual hypotheses in detail. 
In H1, we proposed that R&D–sales cooperation has a more positive effect on relative 
new-product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation if technological turbulence is high. 
The interaction effect between R&D–sales cooperation and technological turbulence is positive 
and significant (β = .14, p < .05) whereas the interactive effect with R&D–marketing cooperation 
is insignificant (β = -.04, ns). Derived from these interactive effects, for high values of 
technological turbulence (mean value +1*standard deviation) the simple slope for R&D–sales 
cooperation is βRSC = .23 (p < .05) and for R&D–marketing cooperation is βRMC = .03 (ns). Since 
βRSC is significantly higher than βRMC (Δ = .20, p < .05), R&D–sales cooperation has a more 
positive effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation if 
technological turbulence is present, which supports H1. 
For H2, we suggest that R&D–sales cooperation has a more positive effect on relative new-
product advantage than R&D–marketing under high competitive intensity. The simple slope 
under this condition for R&D–sales cooperation is βRSC = .10 (p < .10) and for R&D–marketing 
cooperation is βRMC = -.04 (ns). Although βRSC is higher than βRMC the difference between both 
simple slopes is insignificant (Δ = .14, p > .1), providing no support for H2. 
In H3, we predicted that if the company follows a differentiation strategy, R&D–sales 
cooperation has a more positive effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–marketing 
cooperation. Results support this proposition, as the simple slope of R&D–sales cooperation 
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significantly exceeds the simple slope of R&D–marketing cooperation for high levels of 
differentiation strategy (βRSC = .23, p < .01; βRMC = -.01, ns; ΔRSC/RMC = .24, p < .05). Similarly, 
we find support for H4, in which we expected that R&D–marketing cooperation compared to 
R&D–sales cooperation is more important to relative new-product advantage if the company 
focuses on a cost leadership strategy. In this condition, the simple slope of R&D–marketing 
cooperation significantly exceeds the simple slope for R&D–sales cooperation (βRMC = .21, p < 
.05; βRSC = -.01, ns; ΔRSC/RMC = .22, p < .05). 
Regarding moderating effects of R&D characteristics, H5 predicts that if R&D’s culture is 
characterized by high levels of collectivism, R&D–marketing cooperation is more effective. As 
the simple slope for R&D–marketing cooperation at high values of R&D collectivism 
significantly exceeds the R&D–sales cooperation simple slope, we find support for H5 (βRSC = -
.01, ns; βRMC = .22, p < .01; ΔRSC/RMC = .23, p < .01). Conversely, in H6 we argue that if R&D 
power distance is high, R&D–sales cooperation should be more beneficial to relative new-
product advantage than R&D–marketing cooperation. Lending partial support to H6, if power 
distance is high in the R&D department, the simple slope of R&D–sales cooperation exceeds the 
simple slope of R&D–marketing cooperation (βRSC = .21, p < .01; βRMC = .05, ns; ΔRSC/RMC = .16, 
p < .10). However, at very high levels of R&D power distance (mean + 2SD), H6 is fully 
confirmed (βRSC = .30, p < .01; βRMC = .04, ns; ΔRSC/RMC = .26, p < .01). 
In H7, we propose that high levels of R&D influence on new-product decisions render 
R&D–marketing cooperation more effective for relative new-product advantage than R&D–sales 
cooperation. While indeed the simple slope of R&D–marketing cooperation is enhanced and 
significant under this condition (βRMC = .16, p < .05), it does not significantly exceed the simple 
slope of R&D–sales cooperation (βRSC = .07, ns; ΔRSC/RMC = .09, ns). However, at very high 
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levels of R&D power distance (mean + 2SD), H7 is fully confirmed (βRSC = .02, ns; βRMC = .26, 
p < .05; ΔRSC/RMC = .24, p < .05). Finally, results provide support for H8, which predicts that 
R&D–sales cooperation has a stronger effect on relative new-product advantage than R&D–
marketing cooperation if R&D influence on internal budgeting decisions is high. At high levels 
of R&D influence on budgeting decisions, the simple slope of R&D–sales cooperation 
significantly exceeds the simple slope of R&D–marketing cooperation, corroborating H8 (βRSC = 
.23, p < .01; βRMC = -.07, ns; ΔRSC/RMC = .30, p < .01). 
In our model estimation, the main effects of the moderating factors as well as the control 
variables tended to be insignificant. While this result initially may be surprising, it supports the 
necessity of a contingency account in new-product development, which our theoretical 
background and prior research underline (see the meta-analysis of Troy, Hirunyawipada, & 
Paswan 2008). That is, in the area innovation success, independent variables should not tend to 
exhibit unconditional main effects effects on new-product success, but should instead be 
contingent on contextual factors from the organization or market environment. 
4.4  Robustness checks 
We conducted several robustness checks to verify the rigor of our data analyses (see Web 
Appendix W1 for an overview). To assess whether our results are unduly influenced by outliers, 
we inspected Cook’s D. If Cook’s D is greater than 1 for an observation, the observation exerts a 
substantial influence on the findings (Cook & Weisberg 1982). As for our results Cook’s D 
ranges from .00 to .14 with a mean of .008, we conclude that outliers do not distort our results. 
4.4.1 Variance inflation factors 
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We calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) of our main Model 3 to assess whether 
multicollinearity constitutes an issue in our model estimation. The VIFs range from 1.19 to 1.63, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in this model. 
4.4.2 Non-linearity assessment  
To explore non-linearity in our model, we examine whether R&D–sales cooperation or 
R&D–marketing cooperation exhibit quadratic or cubic effects on relative new-product 
advantage. Results of our analysis indicate that R&D–sales cooperation and R&D–marketing 
cooperation have a linear relationship with relative new-product advantage, as the non-linear 
terms are barely significant and the linear models exhibit a better fit the data (see Web Appendix 
W4). 
4.4.3 Alternative model specifications  
To assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in the model, for the key Models 3 and 4 
we estimated each model with either the R&D–sales cooperation or R&D–marketing cooperation 
term only. Results of these additional estimations do not substantially deviate from the outcomes 
of the full Models 3 and 4, underlining the robustness of the findings (see Table 3).  
4.4.4 Model replication hold-out sample  
To conduct an additional robustness check for our model estimation, we assessed Models 
1–4 in Table 3 on a hold-out sample. To this end, we drew a random sample of two-thirds of the 
original data set (n = 153). We employed this random sample to replicate Models 1–4. Results 
show no substantial discrepancies between this validation and the original model estimation (see 
Web Appendix W5 for the results of the hold-out sample). 
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TABLE 4 - Simple Slope Analysis: Contingent Main Effects of R&D–Sales versus R&D–Marketing Cooperation 
Moderator Hypotheses 
Moderator 
X  
RSC 
Moderator  
X  
RMC 
Simple Slope for RSC at 
High Values (Mean + 1SD) 
of Moderator (β RSC) 
Simple Slope for RMC at 
High Values (Mean + 1SD) 
of Moderator (β RMC) 
Do RSC / RMC 
slopes differ 
significantly? 
Hypothesis 
Test 
H1: 
Technological 
turbulence 
If technological 
turbulence is higha, RSC 
has a more positive effect 
on RNPA than RMC. 
β RSC > β RMC 
.14** ns .23*** .03ns β RSC > β RMC Δ= .20** Confirmed 
H2: 
Competitive 
intensity 
If competitive intensity is 
higha, RSC has a more 
positive effect on RNPA 
than RMC. 
β RSC > β RMC 
ns -.11* .10* -.04ns β RSC > β RMC Δ= .14ns 
Not Confirmed 
(Directionally 
Consistent) 
H3: 
Differentiation 
strategy 
If differentiation strategy 
is higha, RSC has a more 
positive effect on RNPA 
than RMC. 
β RSC > β RMC 
.12** ns .23*** -.01ns β RSC > β RMC Δ= .24** Confirmed 
H4: Cost 
leadership 
strategy 
If cost leadership strategy 
is higha, RMC has a more 
positive effect on RNPA 
than RSC. 
β RSC < β RMC 
-.11* .14** -.01ns .21** β RSC < β RMC Δ= .22** Confirmed 
H5: R&D 
collectivism 
If R&D collectivism is 
higha, RMC has a more 
positive effect on RNPA 
than RSC. 
β RSC < β RMC 
-.12** .17*** -.01ns .22*** β RSC < β RMC Δ= .23*** Confirmed 
H6: R&D power 
distance 
If power distance is higha, 
RMC has a more positive 
effect on RNPA than 
RSC. 
β RSC > β RMC 
.11** ns .21*** .05ns β RSC > β RMC Δ= .16* 
Partially 
Confirmed 
(Fully 
Confirmed at 
Mean + 2SD) 
H7: R&D 
Influence on 
new-product 
decisions 
If R&D NPD influence is 
higha, RMC has a more 
positive effect on RNPA 
than RSC. 
β RSC < β RMC 
ns .11ns .07ns .16** β RSC < β RMC Δ= .09ns 
Not Confirmed 
(Confirmed at 
Mean + 2SD) 
H8: R&D 
Influence on 
internal 
budgeting 
decisions 
If R&D budgeting 
influence higha, RSC has 
a more positive effect on 
RNPA than RMC. 
β RSC > β RMC 
.15** -.13** .23*** -0.07ns β RSC > β RMC Δ= .30*** Confirmed 
Note: The table reports standardized coefficients. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed). RNPA = relative new-product advantage, RSC = R&D–sales cooperation, RMC = 
R&D–marketing cooperation; NPD = new-product development; SD = standard deviation; Δ = absolute difference between RSC standardized regression coefficient and RMC 
standardized regression coefficient. aThe moderator level “high” is defined as the moderator’s mean + 1 * SD. 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Summary of findings 
The primary goal of our study was to explore the potential contribution of the marketing 
and sales department to the new-product development process of industrial firms in different 
circumstances. Results of our study are largely in line with research postulating that 
organizational structure should fit company strategy and environment (Ginsberg & Venkatraman 
1985), confirming our conceptualization of a contingency account of R&D–marketing/sales 
cooperation. We find that the relative effectiveness of both cooperation types depends on the 
velocity of the market environment, the firm’s strategic focus, and characteristics of the R&D 
department. Specifically, we find that under conditions of high technological turbulence as well 
as a strong corporate focus on a differentiation strategy, R&D–sales cooperation is robustly 
associated with relative new-product advantage. Conversely, if the company follows a cost 
leadership strategy or R&D collectivism is high, R&D–marketing cooperation is more conducive 
to relative new-product advantage. Moreover, we find tentative evidence that R&D–marketing 
cooperation is more beneficial to innovation success than R&D–sales cooperation if R&D exerts 
a comparatively strong influence on new-product development decisions. Finally, we find that if 
R&D possesses a high level of influence on internal resource allocation decisions, indicating a 
strong technology orientation of the firm (Atuahene-Gima & Evangelista 2000), R&D–sales 
cooperation is strongly associated with relative new-product advantage, as we argue that 
salespeople tend to hold more sophisticated technological product knowledge. 
5.2 Research issues 
Prior research on the incorporation of the ”voice of the customer” in the new-product 
development process strongly focused on the R&D–marketing interface, indicating that 
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associating both functions has merits in terms of increasing relative new-product advantage 
(Troy, Hirunyawipada, & Paswan 2008). However, until recently, academic work in this research 
stream did not distinguish between the role of marketing and that of the sales department in the 
innovation process. Seeing the changing role of sales in many companies and industries—in 
particular, the elevation of the sales department to an organizational actor of highest relevance—
disentangling the roles of marketing and sales in new-product development is managerially and 
scientifically important. In this respect, several researchers have called for a more differentiated 
analysis of the marketing and sales functions (Ernst, Hoyer, & Rübsaamen 2010). In response to 
these calls, with our study we aimed to provide a more fine-grained view on the effectiveness of 
R&D–marketing and R&D–sales cooperation under different contingency factors in the new-
product domain. 
As the first to compare marketing and sales in the innovation process, Ernst, Hoyer, and 
Rübsaamen (2010) show that the direct effects of R&D–marketing cooperation and R&D–sales 
cooperation on relative new-product advantage vary in different stages of the innovation process. 
Our work contributes to this research by applying a contingency perspective to the differential 
effects of marketing and sales in the new-product domain. Introducing a contingency perspective 
to the analysis of R&D–sales cooperation compared to R&D–marketing cooperation may be 
conceptually important, as the effectiveness of R&D–sales versus R&D–marketing cooperation 
for innovation success strongly depends on specific market and company factors. Underlining 
this notion, Troy, Hirunyawipada, and Paswan (2008, p. 132) conclude from their meta-analysis  
that while “cross-functional cooperation may indeed have a direct impact on success, the 
combination of cooperation with other variables may be of greater importance” (see also Olson, 
Walker, & Ruekert 1995). Comparing the effectiveness of R&D–marketing and R&D–sales 
39 
 
 
cooperation across different market environments, company strategies, and R&D factors, results 
reveal in part substantial differences between the contribution of marketing and sales to relative 
new-product advantage. With our study, we refine the assumption of Ernst, Hoyer, and 
Rübsaamen (2010) that sales might additionally support the innovation process supplementary to 
marketing’s contribution. Our results suggest that in certain situations, for example if a company 
follows a differentiation strategy, sales does not make an additional, but necessary contribution, 
essential for the attainment of new-product success. These findings may be helpful to future 
work on the role of marketing and sales in product development, as we draw attention to the need 
to precisely account for the environmental and organizational circumstances under which R&D–
marketing/sales cooperation is studied. 
On the basis of the thought-world concept and the resource-based view, we suggest in our 
hypotheses development that the resources (e.g. knowledge and competences) that sales and 
marketing possess are shaped by their respective thought worlds. As the thought worlds of 
marketing and sales differ considerably (Homburg & Jensen 2007), each department may hold a 
largely distinct set of resources. We propose that these different resource endowments of 
marketing and sales may be responsible for the differential effectiveness of R&D–
marketing/sales cooperation in different market and organizational environments. However, we 
did not assess this conceptual explanation empirically. Therefore, a worthwhile avenue for future 
research in this domain may be to examine the specific mechanisms underlying the different 
effects of R&D–marketing/sales cooperation under different contingencies. Specifically, 
prospective work might assess whether in fact divergent thought worlds of marketing and sales 
manifest in different knowledge bases and competencies, which in turn influence the 
effectiveness of R&D–sales/marketing cooperation under different circumstances. 
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5.3 Managerial implications 
 
Our study provides potentially helpful implications to managerial practice. To achieve 
innovation success, sophisticated knowledge of customers’ wishes and competitive offers 
undoubtedly needs to be included in new-product development. However, in light of the high 
costs associated with establishing cooperation among R&D and other departments, the question 
arises as to whether R&D–sales cooperation or R&D–marketing cooperation is more 
instrumental in instilling the voice of the customer. For companies, our study indicates that 
careful evaluation of the department with which R&D collaborates may be warranted, because 
the effectiveness of R&D–sales versus R&D–marketing cooperation for relative new-product 
advantage is subject to market factors, company strategy, and R&D characteristics and, as such, 
might vary strongly. 
Specifically, in highly dynamic market environments marked by high technological 
turbulence, companies may consider encouraging R&D’s cooperation with the sales department. 
Since the boundary-spanning function sales is the organizational actor closest to the market and 
the individual customer, in these high-velocity environments sales is potentially positioned to 
provide sophisticated market knowledge to R&D. Results of a simulation on the basis of our 
model estimation show that for very high levels of technological turbulence (two standard 
deviations above the mean level of technological turbulence; please refer to Table 5 for an 
overview of the simulation analysis), industrial firms relying on R&D–sales cooperation gain a 
relative new-product advantage 17% higher than firms that are not relying on R&D–sales 
cooperation. Moreover, companies might foster R&D–sales cooperation if they follow a 
differentiation strategy, as this strategy requires a profound understanding of customer needs and 
competitors’ offerings. If firms strongly focus on a differentiation strategy (two standard 
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deviations above the mean), our simulation reveals that firms relying on R&D–sales cooperation 
exhibit a relative new-product advantage 18% higher than firms that are not relying on this 
cooperation type under these circumstances. Conversely, if a company pursues a cost leadership 
strategy, R&D–marketing cooperation may be more conducive to relative new-product 
advantage. Results of a simulation on the basis of our model estimation show that for very high 
levels of cost leadership strategy (two standard deviations above the mean) industrial firms 
relying on R&D–marketing cooperation gain a relative new-product advantage 12% higher than 
firms who are not relying on the latter in these circumstances.   
Concerning R&D characteristics, companies may consider fostering cooperation with 
R&D that is characterized by high cultural fit and low friction owing to power imbalances. Our 
results tentatively show that companies might foster R&D’s cooperation with sales if R&D’s 
culture nurtures the value of power distance. In contrast, if R&D’s culture is marked by high 
levels of collectivism, R&D–marketing cooperation may be more beneficial to new-product 
advantage. Regarding R&D power, firms could encourage R&D–sales cooperation to increase 
relative new-product advantage if R&D’s influence on internal budgeting decisions is high. 
Generally, results of our study indicate that managers might account for the differences in 
marketing’s and sales’ thought worlds when deciding on cooperation partners for R&D. To 
successfully promote relative new-product advantage, high-quality cooperation between the two 
departments is a key prerequisite. Since the potential cooperation quality with either marketing 
or sales might differ depending on department culture and power constellation, companies might 
screen marketing and sales regarding these factors to increase the effectiveness of the 
collaboration with R&D. 
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TABLE 5 – Simulation Analysis: Effects of R&D–Sales/Marketing Cooperation on 
Relative New Product Advantage for High Moderator Values (Mean + 2*SD) 
 
Very High Values of Moderator 
(Mean + 2 SD) 
Difference in Relative New-Product Advantage Associated with High 
Levels (as Compared to low levels) of  
 R&D–marketing cooperation R&D–sales cooperation 
Technological turbulence +-0% +17% 
Differentiation strategy -2% +18% 
R&D power distance +1% +14% 
R&D influence on internal budgeting -6% +15% 
Cost leadership strategy +12% -5% 
R&D collectivism +13% -6% 
R&D influence on new-product 
decisions +8% +/-0% 
Notes. The simulation analysis is based on the results of the main Model 3 (see Table 3). Simple slope coefficients for the effects 
of R&D–sales/marketing cooperation are estimated at very high moderator values, i.e. at the moderator mean + 2 * standard 
deviation (SD). These simple slope coefficients are then utilized to compute relative new-product advantage levels for high levels 
(mean + 1 * SD) and low levels (mean – 1 * SD) of R&D–sales/marketing cooperation. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
this excellent suggestion to illustrate our results more clearly. 
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APPENDIX 
Measurement Instruments 
 
Constructs / Items Sources Data Source  CR AVE 
Relative New Product Advantagea 
Our product innovations …: 
1. … are superior to competing products in terms of meeting customer needs. 
2. … provide novel product features to customers which competitors do not offer.  
2. … are superior to competing products in product quality. 
4. … offer unique attributes to customers not available from competing products. 
Li and Calantone 
1998; Song and 
Monotoya-Weiss 
2001 
Assessment of 
market-side 
respondent 
.80 .52 
Financial New Product Performancea 
Our product innovations …: 
1. … are financially very successful. 
2. … have a strong and positive impact on our company’s sales and profitability.  
Harmancioglu, 
Droge, and  
Calantone (2009) 
Assessment of 
technical side 
respondent 
- - 
Objective Company Performance - Archival Records - - 
R&D–Sales Cooperation 
Please indicate the level of cooperation between R&D and sales for the following activities: 
(Likert scale: 1 = very low; 7 = very high) 
1. Analysis of customer needs. 
2. Generation of new-product ideas. 
3. Identifying opportunities for commercial application of new technology. 
4. Defining goals and priorities in NPD. 
5. Project planning and budgeting in NPD. 
6. Development of commercialization concepts. 
Ernst, Hoyer, and 
Rübsaamen 
(2010) 
 
Song and Parry 
(1992) 
Mean scores of 
respondents from 
market side and 
technical side 
.92 .67 
R&D–Marketing Cooperation 
Please indicate the level of cooperation between R&D and marketing for the following activities: 
(Likert scale: 1 = very low; 7 = very high) 
1. Analysis of customer needs. 
2. Generation of new-product ideas. 
3. Identifying opportunities for commercial application of new technology. 
4. Defining goals and priorities in NPD. 
5. Project planning and budgeting in NPD. 
6. Development of commercialization concepts. 
Ernst, Hoyer, and 
Rübsaamen 
(2010) 
 
Song and Parry 
(1992) 
Mean scores of 
respondents from 
market side and 
technical side 
.95 .74 
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Technological Turbulencea 
1. The technology in our industry is changing constantly. 
2. Technological changes provide big opportunities in our industry. 
3, It is difficult to forecast where the technology in our industry will be in 2-3 years. 
4. A large number of new-product ideas have been made possible through technological 
breakthroughs in our industry. 
5. Technological developments in our industry are rather high. 
Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) 
Assessment of 
technical-side 
respondent 
.85 .53 
Competitive Intensitya 
1. Competition in our industry is cutthroat. 
2. There are many "promotion wars" in our industry. 
3. Our competitors are relatively strong. 
4. Price competition is a hallmark of our industry. 
5. One hears of a new competitive move almost every day. 
Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) 
Assessment of 
market-side 
respondent 
.86 .55 
Differentiation Strategya 
To what extent does your business unit emphasize the following activities?   
My business unit focuses on… 
1. …creating a premium product or brand image. 
2. …creating competitive advantage by providing superior products. 
3. …creating superior customer value by providing premium products. 
4. …creating a premium positioning for products in the market. 
Homburg, 
Workman, and 
Krohmer (1999) 
Assessment of 
market-side 
respondent 
.83 .55 
Cost Leadership Strategya 
To what extent does your business unit emphasize the following activities?   
My business unit focuses on… 
1. …standardizing operational processes in the organization. 
2. …realizing cost savings in organizational processes. 
3. …streamlining processes in the organization.    
Homburg, 
Workman, and 
Krohmer (1999) 
Assessment of 
market-side 
respondent 
.78 .54 
R&D Power Distancea 
1. In our department, it is expected that instructions of superiors are not questioned. 
2. In our department, superiors and employees tend to have a distanced relationship. 
3. In our department, an employee’s influence primarily depends on his hierarchical position. 
Hofstede and 
Bond (1984) 
Assessment of 
technical-side 
respondent 
.77 .53 
R&D Collectivisma 
1. In our department, team work is strongly promoted. 
2. In our department, superiors actively foster the cohesion of employees. 
3. In our department, the team spirit is strong across all hierarchical levels. 
Hofstede and 
Bond (1984) 
Assessment of 
technical-side 
respondent 
.86 .68 
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R&D Influence on New-Product Decisions 
Please rate the influence that your department exerts on the following tasks: 
(constant sum scale: 0 = no influence at all; 100 = very strong influence) 
1. DeteRMCning technical features of new products. 
2. DeteRMCning the level of complexity of new products. 
Adopted from 
Krohmer, 
Homburg, and 
Workman (2002) 
Assessment of 
technical-side 
respondent 
- - 
R&D Influence on Internal Budgeting Decisions 
Please rate the influence that your department exerts on the following tasks: 
(constant sum scale: 0 = no influence at all; 100 = very strong influence) 
1. Determining the budget and resource allocation within the business unit. 
2. Determining significant strategic investments within the business unit. 
Adopted from 
Krohmer, 
Homburg, and 
Workman (2002) 
Assessment of 
technical-side 
respondent 
- - 
Product Customizationa 
1. We adapt our products to individual customer requirements. 
2. We offer each customer tailored products. 
3. Important features of our products are specifically tied to our customers. 
Newly developed 
Assessment of 
market-side 
respondent 
.87 .70 
Top Management Support for Innovation Projects 
Our top management … 
(Likert scale: 1 = very low; 7 = very high) 
1. … is actively involved in innovation projects. 
2. … supports innovation projects from start to finish. 
3. … provides the required resources for innovation projects. 
4. … expects sales to fully support new products. 
Newly developed 
Assessment of 
market-side 
respondent 
.80 .52 
Firm Size 
Natural logarithm of the number of employees 
- Archival sources - - 
Industry Affiliation 
Dummy variable indicating industry affiliation 
- Archival sources - - 
a(Likert scale: 1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree 
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Web Appendix 
The Contingent Roles of R&D-Sales versus R&D-Marketing Cooperation in New 
Product Development of Business-to-Business Firms 
 
Web Appendix W1 – Overview of Methodological Robustness Checks 
Overview of Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks 
Type of analysis Description/Results Section of manuscript 
Moderated indirect effects 
of R&D-Marketing/Sales 
cooperation on financial 
new product performance 
We conducted a moderated mediation analysis 
assessing the indirect effects of R&D-Sales and R&D-
Marketing cooperation on financial new product 
performance via relative new product advantage at the 
hypothesized values of the moderators. Results of this 
analysis show that relative new product advantage 
indeed mediates the effects of the interaction terms on 
financial new product performance. 
p. 28 and Web Appendix W2 
Depiction of Interaction 
Diagrams - Web Appendix W3 
Calculation of VIFs to 
assess multicollinearity 
Results show VIFs between 1.19 to 1.63 indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a major issue. p. 35 
Test of potential non-
linear relationships 
Results indicate that R&D-Marketing/Sales cooperation 
do not exhibit non-linear effects on relative new product 
advantage. 
p. 35 and Web Appendix W4 
Model replication with hold 
out sample 
We randomly selected two-thirds of the observations 
from the original sample and reran Model 1-4 from 
Table 3. Results do not substantially deviate from the 
initial estimations. 
p. 35 and Web Appendix W5 
Extended correlation table 
with interaction terms - Web Appendix W6 
Analysis of influence 
statistic 
Based on Cook’s D, results show that the data set does 
not contain overly influential observations unduly 
affecting results. 
p. 34 
Estimation of additional 
models as robustness 
checks 
We reran Models 1-4 from Table 3 excluding either all 
R&D-Sales cooperation or all R&D-Marketing 
cooperation terms. These estimations underline the 
robustness of the results. 
p. 35 
Assessment of response 
accuracy of sales vs. 
marketing managers as 
key informants 
Results show that marketing and sales managers (like 
in Homburg and Jensen 2007) do not seem to differ 
systematically in their responses. 
Web Appendix W7 
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Web Appendix W2 – Moderated Indirect Effects of R&D-Sales and R&D-Marketing 
Cooperation on Financial New Product Performance 
 Indirect Effects of R&D-Sales Cooperation Indirect Effects of R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
 Indirect Effect: RSC  RNPA  FNPP Indirect Effect: RMC  RNPA  FNPP 
Moderator LOW values of Moderator 
HIGH values of 
Moderator 
LOW values of 
Moderator 
HIGH values of 
Moderator 
H1: Technological 
Turbulence -.01ns .08** -
a -a 
H2: Competitive Intensity -a -a .06* -.01ns 
H3: Differentiation Strategy -.01ns .10** - - 
H4: Cost Strategy -a -a -.03ns .07** 
H5: R&D Power Distance .01ns .07** -a -a 
H6: R&D Collectivism -a -a -.02ns .07** 
H7: R&D Influence on New 
Product Decisions -
a -a -.01ns .05* 
H8: R&D Influence on 
Internal Budgeting 
Decisions 
-.02ns .08** -a -a 
Notes. The table reports standardized coefficients. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed); RSC = R&D-Sales Cooperation; RMC = 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation; RNPA = Relative New Product Advantage; FNPP = Financial New Product Performance aNot shown 
because interaction effect in the model estimation (see Model 3, Table 3) was not significant 
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Web Appendix W3 – Interaction Diagrams 
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Web Appendix W4 – Testing for Potential Nonlinear Relationships of R&D-
Sales/Marketing Cooperation on Relative New Product Advantage 
To explore non-linearity in our model, we examine whether R&D-Sales cooperation (RSC) or 
R&D-Marketing cooperation (RMC) exhibit quadratic or cubic effects on relative new 
product advantage. Results of our analysis indicate that RSC and RMC have a linear 
relationship with relative new product advantage as the non-linear terms are barely significant 
and the linear models exhibit a better fit with the data.  
 R&D-Sales Cooperation 
 Dependent Variable: Relative New Product Advantage 
Independent 
Variable Linear Model Quadratic Model Cubic Model 
R&D-Sales 
Cooperation .27*** .31*** .29*** 
R&D-Sales 
Cooperation² - .11* .12* 
R&D-Sales 
Cooperation³ - - .02ns 
R² .07 .08 .08 
ΔR² - ns ns 
F-Value 18.23 11.06 7.35 
 
 R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
 Dependent Variable: Relative New Product Advantage 
Independent 
Variable Linear Model Quadratic Model Cubic Model 
R&D-Marketing 
Cooperation .16** .17** .11ns 
R&D- Marketing 
Cooperation² - .11* .10ns 
R&D- Marketing 
Cooperation³ - - .06ns 
R² .02 .03 .03 
ΔR² - ns Ns 
F-Value 5.83 4.41 2.97 
Notes. The table reports standardized coefficients. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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Web Appendix W5 – Assessment of Estimation Models on Holdout Sample 
 Dependent Variable: Relative New Product Advantage 
 
Model 1 
Key Main 
Effects 
 
Model 1 with 
Holdout Sample 
Model 2 
Key Main 
Effects and 
Moderators 
Model 2 
With  
Holdout Sample 
Main Effects     
R&D-Sales Cooperation .16*** .22*** .13** .17** 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation .14** .10* .08ns .06ns 
Competitive Intensity   -.01ns -.03ns 
Technological Turbulence   -.04ns -.09ns 
Differentiation Strategy   .34*** .33*** 
Cost Strategy   -.02ns -.01ns 
R&D Power Distance   .02ns .01ns 
R&D Collectivism   .06ns .03ns 
R&D Influence on New Product 
Decisions   -.02ns .01ns 
R&D Influence on Internal Budgeting 
Decisions   .03ns .09ns 
R&D-Sales Cooperation Interaction 
Effects     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x Competitive 
Intensity     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
Technological Turbulence     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
Differentiation Strategy     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x Cost 
Strategy     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x R&D Power 
Distance     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x R&D 
Collectivism     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x R&D 
Influence on New Product Decisions     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x R&D 
Influence on Internal Budgeting 
Decisions 
    
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
Interaction Effects     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x 
Competitive Intensity     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x 
Technological Turbulence     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x 
Differentiation Strategy     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x Cost 
Strategy     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x R&D 
Power Distance     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x R&D 
Collectivism     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x R&D 
Influence on New Product Decisions     
R&D-Marketing Cooperation x R&D 
Influence on Internal Budgeting 
Decisions 
    
Controls     
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Top Management Support .29*** .36*** .20*** .25*** 
Size -.04ns -.02ns -.05ns -.04ns 
Product Customization .04ns .11ns .03ns .10ns 
R² .22 .29 .33 .39 
Notes. The table reports standardized coefficients. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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 Dependent Variable: Relative New Product Advantage 
 Model 3 Full Model 
Model 3 
With  
Holdout Sample 
Model 4 
Robustness 
Check Full Model 
without Controls 
Model 4 
With 
Holdout Sample 
Main Effects     
R&D-Sales Cooperation .10** .09* .19*** .18** 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation .06ns .04ns .04ns .07ns 
Competitive Intensity .04ns .04ns .06ns .06ns 
Technological Turbulence -.05ns -.08ns -.04ns -.07ns 
Differentiation Strategy .37*** .39*** .43*** .46*** 
Cost Strategy -.01ns .06ns .01ns .03ns 
R&D Power Distance .05ns .08ns .02ns .02ns 
R&D Collectivism .06ns .05ns -.01ns -.01ns 
R&D Influence on New 
Product Decisions -.01ns .05ns .05ns .10ns 
R&D Influence on Internal 
Budgeting Decisions .03ns .09ns .04ns .08ns 
R&D-Sales Cooperation 
Interaction Effects     
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
Competitive Intensity -.01ns -.01ns -.03ns -.04ns 
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
Technological Turbulence .14** .12* .14** .14* 
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
Differentiation Strategy .12** .15** .11** .17** 
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
Cost Strategy -.11** -.09ns -.08ns -.02ns 
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
R&D Power Distance .11** .18** .14*** .24*** 
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
R&D Collectivism -.12** -.15** -.12** -.18** 
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
R&D Influence on New 
Product Decisions 
-.04ns -.02ns -.05ns -.03ns 
R&D-Sales Cooperation x 
R&D Influence on Internal 
Budgeting Decisions 
.15*** .14** .14** .13* 
R&D-Marketing 
Cooperation Interaction 
Effects 
    
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x Competitive Intensity -.11** -.15** -.10** -.15** 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x Technological Turbulence -.04ns .07ns -.02ns .07ns 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x Differentiation Strategy -.07ns -.06ns -.05ns -.05ns 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x Cost Strategy .14** .20** .16*** .22*** 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x R&D Power Distance -.01ns .03ns -.07ns -.06ns 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x R&D Collectivism .17*** .18** .15*** .18** 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x R&D Influence on New 
Product Decisions 
.11* .03ns .08ns .01ns 
R&D-Marketing Cooperation 
x R&D Influence on Internal 
Budgeting Decisions 
-.13** -.19** -.14** -.20*** 
Controls     
Industry Dummies Included Included Not Included Not Included 
Top Management Support .15*** .18** - - 
Size .02ns -.02ns - - 
Product Customization .08* .12* - - 
R² .42 .50 .36 .42 
Notes. The table reports standardized coefficients. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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Web Appendix W6 – Full Correlation Table 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
16. R&D-Sales 
Cooperation (RSC) -                               
17. R&D-Marketing 
Cooperation (RMC) .15 -                              
18. Relative new product 
advantage .27 .17 -                             
19. Competitive Intensity -.09 -.09 -.08 -                            
20. Technological 
Turbulence .03 .11 -.01 .01 -                           
21. Differentiation 
Strategy .14 .23 .42 -.18 .07 -                          
22. Cost Strategy .12 .22 .13 .09 .04 .23 -                         
23. R&D Power Distance -.07 -.10 -.05 -.01 -.11 -.08 -.12 -                        
24. R&D Collectivism .10 .12 .08 -.01 .23 .10 .04 -.29 -                       
25. R&D Influence on 
New Product 
Decisions 
-.11 -.16 -.04 .03 .06 -.12 -.04 -.19 .09 -                      
26. R&D Influence on 
Internal Budgeting 
Decisions 
.04 .08 .08 -.07 .02 .12 .08 -.12 .18 .30 -                     
27. Top Management 
Support .22 .07 .27 .03 .09 .21 .06 -.11 .28 .04 .07 -                    
28. Size -.14 .24 -.13 -.01 .10 -.02 .15 -.03 .09 .02 .13 -.11 -                   
29. Product 
Customization .35 -.06 .13 -.03 .01 .09 -.01 -.09 .02 .01 -.04 .02 -.09 -                  
30. Financial New 
Product Performance .16 .15 .19 .00 .23 .16 .00 -.07 .22 .02 .11 .07 .11 -.02 -                 
31. RSC x Competitive 
Intensity .13 -.01 -.04 -.02 .04 .04 -.01 -.13 .05 .08 .03 -.06 -.04 .10 -.02 -                
32. RSC x Technological 
Turbulence .15 .08 .18 .04 -.08 .10 .04 .04 .07 -.05 .00 .17 -.13 -.10 .10 -.09 -               
33. RSC x Differentiation 
Strategy .04 -.01 .14 .05 .12 -.07 .05 -.12 .08 .07 .03 .03 -.07 .02 .03 -.14 .09 -              
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34. RSC x Cost Strategy .06 -.01 -.02 -.01 .04 .05 -.06 -.08 .03 .03 -.05 .04 -.15 .12 -.06 .11 -.07 .25 -             
35. RSC x R&D Power 
Distance .06 -.04 .08 -.13 .04 -.09 -.08 -.07 -.03 -.07 -.04 -.11 -.05 .09 .02 .09 -.15 .02 -.09 -            
36. RSC x R&D 
Collectivism .01 .02 .00 .05 .09 .08 .03 -.04 -.05 .02 .00 .02 .03 .02 .09 -.08 .12 .16 .15 -.20 -           
37. RSC x R&D 
Influence on New 
Product Decisions 
.02 -.01 .02 .09 -.07 .08 .03 -.08 -.02 .00 .10 .00 .02 .05 .08 .11 .16 -.10 .02 -.01 .01 -          
38. RSC x R&D 
Influence on Internal 
Budgeting Decisions 
-.08 -.07 .09 .03 .01 .03 -.05 -.04 .00 .11 .03 .02 -.05 -.06 .07 -.14 .06 .12 .15 -.18 .06 .23 -         
39. RMC x Competitive 
Intensity -.01 .05 -.02 -.01 .01 .19 .02 -.09 -.05 -.06 .13 -.02 .03 .04 -.01 .21 -.11 -.16 .00 -.02 .04 .00 .06 -        
40. RMC x Technological 
Turbulence .09 .07 .14 .01 -.06 .11 -.02 .10 .07 .02 .00 .12 .00 -.07 .06 -.11 .27 .10 -.03 -.19 .08 -.03 -.01 -.01 -       
41. RMC x Differentiation 
Strategy -.01 .00 -.07 .19 .09 -.12 -.04 .02 .14 .08 -.03 .03 .00 -.02 -.04 -.13 .10 .32 .10 .00 .10 .10 .08 -.21 .05 -      
42. RMC x Cost Strategy -.01 .01 .10 .03 -.02 -.05 -.09 .00 -.05 .03 -.04 .14 -.13 -.06 .05 .00 -.03 .12 .24 .01 -.04 .19 .09 .15 .06 .25 -     
43. RMC x R&D Power 
Distance -.04 -.07 -.10 -.11 .10 .02 .01 -.08 -.08 -.02 .05 -.23 .07 -.03 -.08 -.03 -.17 .00 .01 .23 -.03 .00 -.05 -.06 -.16 -.16 -.18 -    
44. RMC x R&D 
Collectivism .02 .11 .16 -.05 .08 .15 -.05 -.08 .01 -.03 -.04 .07 -.07 -.06 .06 .06 .05 .11 .10 -.03 -.07 -.05 -.07 .02 .22 .01 .00 -.16 -   
45. RMC x R&D 
Influence on New 
Product Decisions 
-.01 .08 .08 -.06 .02 .08 .03 -.02 -.02 -.09 .11 -.05 .02 .04 .06 .03 -.07 .03 .00 .00 -.04 .28 .13 .10 .08 -.12 .04 -.19 -.07 -  
46. RMC x R&D 
Influence on Internal 
Budgeting Decisions 
-.07 -.01 -.03 .14 .01 -.03 -.04 .06 -.04 .12 .00 -.03 -.01 -.02 .03 .06 -.02 .09 .08 -.05 .01 .08 .17 -.08 .12 .16 .17 -.29 .20 .27 - 
Means 4.1 3.4 5.1 5.1 4.3 5.7 5.0 2.4 5.2 52 23 5.3 5.7 5.2 4.8 -.11 .04 .14 .19 -.09 .15 -2.3 .83 -.15 .22 .37 .36 -.18 .24 -5.2 2.6 
Standard Deviation 1.1 1.6 1.0 .99 1.1 .94 1.1 1.0 1.2 19 18 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 .70 1.5 21 20 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 .80 33 30 
Cronbach’s Alpha .92 .94 .79 .84 .82 .77 .71 .70 .86 .79 .80 .78 - .87 .93 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Note: Sample based on n = 230 firms. Absolute values of correlation coefficients above .13 (.17) are significant on a 5% (1%) level.
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Web Appendix W7– Assessment of Response Accuracy of Sales vs. Marketing Managers 
as Key Informants 
 
For all variables in the conceptual model provided by the market-side respondent (R&D-Sales 
cooperation, R&D-Marketing cooperation, differentiation strategy, cost leadership strategy, 
relative new product advantage), we tested whether in the marketing or sales manager 
subsample perceptual congruence differs between the market-side and technical-side 
respondent. Therefore, we calculated the absolute deviation between the technical-side 
respondent and market-side respondent for the respective variables. We then regress this score 
on a binary variable (coded 1 = marketing manager 0 = sales manager). The following table 
presents the results, showing that the congruence between market-side respondent and 
technical-side respondent does not differ for marketing and sales managers. 
 
 Deviation between Market-Side Respondent and Technical-Side Respondent  (β standardized coefficient) 
 R&D-Sales cooperation 
R&D-Marketing 
cooperation 
Differentiation 
Strategy 
Cost 
Leadership 
Strategy 
Relative New 
Product 
Advantage 
Dummy Variable: 
Respondent from Sales (0)  
versus 
Respondent from 
Marketing (1) 
.01ns -.11ns -.07ns -.06ns -.08ns 
ns = not significant 
 
59 
 
 
 
Web Appendix W8– Overview of introductory study 
With whom should the research and development department collaborate to ensure 
the success of new product in your view? 
 
 
 
Category Variable Distribution 
Country 
United States 70 (35.0%) 
Germany 130 (65.0%) 
Retail 
industries 
Automobile 43 (21.5%) 
Jewelry 28 (14.0%) 
Furniture 39 (19.5%) 
Electronics 34 (17.0%) 
Fashion 56 (28.0%) 
Demographics 
Gender 97 male (48.5%) 103 female (51.5%) 
Average age 39.0 
Average years of job experience  14.8 
 
 
